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Abstract
As is evident from current military operations that are happening around the globe (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea), today’s
military is being called on in numerous new and innovative ways (e.g., Foster & Lindsay, 2011). One of the primary forces behind
this change is the pervasiveness of enhanced information systems. In fact, the concept of networked warfare is the basis of operations
and doctrine for the armed forces (Wesensten, Belenky, & Balkin, 2005). With respect to Admiral Cebrowski’s quote, it appears that
this notion of information in warfare is going to continue to influence the way that we approach and conduct war for the foreseeable
future. While this use of information and information systems have been used successfully in recent operations (Cammons,
Tisserand, Williams, Seise, & Lindsay, 2006), it must always be considered with respect to the operational context. This context is
made up of the military’s primary weapon system (the individual solider) and the features of the operational environment in which
they are expected to perform.
Within the context of current military operations, the individual combatant is experiencing demands never before seen by
predecessors. While deployments and warfare are certainly not new to military personnel, expectations regarding the use and
processing of information during these operations is at an unprecedented level. These changing expectations regarding information
processing have virtually transformed the soldier into a ‘‘cognitive platform’’. While this platform is certainly the most capable the
world has ever seen, there are factors which limit this platform’s warfighting capability. These include such factors as nutritional or
caloric deficiencies, dehydration, psychological stressors, carrying excessive loads, and hypothermia (Lieberman et al., 2005;
Meyerhoff et al., 2000; Wesensten et al., 2005). Another key factor is sleep. While sleep is a basic physiological need that is usually
regulated by the individual, in a military environment conditions often dictate how much sleep is obtained (and the quality of that
sleep), independent of the individual military member’s personal needs or desires. Somewhat absent, however, is a critical
examination of the impact of sleep loss on this ‘‘new’’ cognitive platform in today’s military environment. While some research has
been done to address pieces of this issue (Wesensten et al., 2005), there are still many gaps that remain. Therefore, the purpose of this
review is to briefly examine what is known about the effects of sleep and predict the implications of restricted sleep and sleep loss in
this informationally-enhanced environment. In order to do this, three areas need to be examined in greater detail: the current
operational military environment, the amount of sleep required, and sleep loss and its subsequent effects on cognitive functioning
and resulting decision making in such an environment. Finally, implications in light of this information and attempts at mitigation are
suggested.
What we are seeing, in moving from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, is what amounts to a new theory of war:
power comes from a different place, it is used in different ways, it achieves different effects than it did before. During the
Industrial Age, power came from mass. Now power tends to come from information, access, and speed. We have come to
call that new theory of war network-centric warfare. It is not only about networks, but also about how wars are fought—
how power is developed.
— Vice Admiral (Retd) Arthur K. Cebrowski (Office of Force Transformation, 2005)
The Current Operational Military Environment
Operational demands of US military forces are at an all-time high. One can virtually take an atlas of the world, blindfold
oneself, throw a dart at it, and it is likely that anywhere the dart lands, military operations are either taking place or have
recently taken place there. Gone are the days where large
stationary bases consisting of large numbers of military
personnel are the norm, as was the case during the Cold
War. At any given moment, there are tens of thousands of
American military members scattered around the globe on
missions ranging from direct combat operations to
humanitarian relief.
Indeed, the whole military establishment has undergone
radical changes. This is evidenced by recently established
organizations such as the Office of Force Transformation,
created by the Department of Defense. This organization
was established in 2001 to focus on examining what the
future of the military and warfare should be, and how to get
there. One of the major thrusts in the transformation of the
military is with regard to network-centric warfare. Under
this concept, ‘‘network-centric warfare broadly describes
the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques,
and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a
partially networked force can employ to create a decisive
warfighting advantage’’ (Office of Force Transformation,
2005). Put another way, ‘‘network-centric operations are
characterized by information-sharing across multiple levels
of traditional echelons of command and control. This
information-sharing is made possible by networking the
entire force down to the individual level’’ (Wesensten et al.,
2005, p. 94). When taken together with the previous quote
by Admiral Cebrowski, it is obvious that the future of the
military will involve not just traditional military weapon
systems, but also a significant amount of technology and
complex information processing in order to effectively
wage this network-centric warfare. These demands on
modern combatants render them particularly vulnerable to
environmental and internal disruptions which may decrease
their performance (i.e., cognitive functioning). Among the
most potentially devastating and common factors likely to
produce reduction in performance efficiency is sleep
disruption and deprivation.
The US armed forces are utilizing technological
advances that provide more data and more information to
the individual combatant. As this pace of providing current
warfare information continues to increase, the operational
tempo naturally places more emphasis on continuous 24/7
operations. These technologies are designed to run
continuously without regard to day or night. Yet, the
human solider utilizing such technology requires a
substantial amount of rest at specific times in order to
operate effectively. In fact, the deleterious effects of sleep
deprivation and sleep disruption are well documented (e.g.,
Shay, 1998).
Central to this discussion is the question of whether there
are operational constraints that will act to limit the
effectiveness of individual combatants to accomplish their
mission? The demands of new technological warfare and
the limitations of human functioning (as well as the
biological composition of human beings) necessarily place
limits on human performance in deployed and combat
operations. We now turn our attention to one of these
significant constraints: the amount of sleep a soldier needs
versus what they actually receive.
Amount of Sleep
Fundamental to good health, and certainly critical to
military performance and readiness, is adequate sleep.
While this seems like an obvious statement, there are many
factors which influence and curtail one’s ability to obtain
optimal sleep, such as workload, environmental conditions
(weather, noise, etc.), and stress. This is evident through
recent studies that indicate many Americans receive less
than six hours of sleep per night (e.g., Bonnet & Arand,
1995; Jean-Louis, Kripke, & Ancoli-Israel, 2000; Kripke,
Garfinkel, Wingard, Klauber, & Marler, 2002; National
Sleep Foundation, 2002). This is in contrast to the 8 hours
that are necessary for optimal sleep in adults (Belenky
et al., 2003). While this lowered amount of sleep is often
used to justify getting more done, it comes at very tangible
costs. This is evidenced through decrements in health,
performance, and other outcomes (Belenky et al., 2003;
Pilcher & Huffcutt, 1996; Van Dongen, Maislin,
Mullington, & Dinges, 2003).
However, the idea of sleep loss is not as straightforward
as it may first appear. Several considerations must be made
in order to examine what is meant by sleep loss. The first
consideration involves examining how sleep loss is
measured. One way in which this is described is total
sleep deprivation. Total restriction is usually examined in a
laboratory for precise experimental control and is the best
way to examine large decreases in performance over a
relatively short period of time (Belenky et al., 2003). In
fact, studies have examined sleep deprivation ranging from
one night to over 70 hours of total sleep loss, with
predictable decreases in performance as the length of the
sleep loss increases (e.g., Harrison & Horne, 1999; Heuer
& Klein, 2003; Horne & Pettitt, 1985).
A relatively new approach in sleep science is to examine
partial sleep restriction. This type of sleep loss refers to less
than necessary periods of sleep for the individual every
night for a period of time (Carskadon & Dement, 1981;
Dinges et al., 1997; Dinges et al., 1999). This type of sleep
loss, while less frequently studied, is more common than
total sleep deprivation, and seems to be quickly becoming a
regular cost of the normal adult lifestyle (Belenky et al.,
2003; Dement & Vaughn, 1999). While most individuals,
for one reason or another, have missed a night of sleep, it is
more typical for an individual to get less than the required
amount of sleep on a repeated basis.
The second consideration is that sleep is different for
every individual. In addition to the host of factors that can
influence sleep amount and sleep quality is the fact
that sleep requirements also vary as a function of age
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(Carskadon, Wolfson, Tzischinsky, & Acebo, 1995;
Wolfson & Carskadon, 1998; 2003). For example, research
shows that while adults need approximately 8 hours of
sleep per night, an adolescent in their late teens or early
twenties requires about 9.25 hours of sleep per night for
optimal performance and daily functioning (Carskadon,
1990; Carskadon, Vieira, & Acebo, 1993). Of particular
interest to the military is the fact that a significant portion
of military members are below the age of 26. For example,
39% of United States Air Force military personnel are
under this age (45.7% of enlisted and 12.8% of officers: Air
Force Personnel News Service, 2006). Considering that the
accession of military members starts at the age of 18, a
large portion of the military force is at a time in their
development where sleep requirements are at an increased
level. As a result, there has been recent research targeted at
examining these ‘‘newest’’ military members and their
sleep habits in the different services of the armed forces.
While there are obvious differences between the cultures of
the various armed forces in the United States (Mastroianni,
2005), issues such as sleep habits tend to be remarkably
consistent.
A recent study examined the sleep habits of military
personnel undergoing Navy Basic Training (Miller, Dyche,
Andrews, & Lucas, 2004). At Recruit Training Command
(RTC), the training organization responsible for Navy basic
training, ‘‘lights out’’ occurred at 2200, while reveille
sounded at 0400, for a total sleep time of six hours. This
schedule was in place from the 1970s. However, early in
2002, RTC extended the sleep time by two hours by
pushing back the reveille time to 0600. Therefore, recruits
were able to get 8 hours of sleep. Results from RTC
demonstrated significant improvements on graduating test
scores, attrition being cut in half, and significantly reducing
the number of sick calls at the recruit medical clinic simply
by changing the sleep duration of recruits. These results
benefit both the individual military member as well as the
organization.
This research has not been limited to the Navy. There are
currently ongoing sleep studies at both the United States
Military Academy (USMA) and the United States Air
Force Academy (USAFA). Using a combination of sleep
diaries, self report, and actigraphy (wrist worn devices that
measure sleep duration), researchers are attempting to
determine the actual sleep demographics of future military
members in a demanding environment. At USMA,
researchers found that cadets are receiving far less than
the eight hours of sleep that is recommended (Carskadon,
1990). Studies show that cadets sleep on average, 4.83
hours on week nights and 6.53 hours on weekends (Miller
& Shattuck, 2005). In a related effort, it was found that
cadets were sleeping on average 4.86 hours per night on
week nights and 6.56 hours per night on weekends, for an
average of 5.32 hours per night (Kenney & Neverosky,
2004). These data indicate that, even on weekends, when
cadets have less formal activities and a small amount of
discretionary time, they are still unable to get to the
recommended level of sleep or to catch up for sleep lost
during the week.
The data are similar at the United States Air Force
Academy. In a study by Lindsay et al. (2005), it was
demonstrated that cadets, on average, were obtaining less
than six hours of sleep during the night, and that 10 percent
of these students were receiving less than 3.7 hours per
night (see also Miller et al., 2000). More recently, a
comprehensive examination of sleep at USAFA has been
initiated. Using both surveys and actigraphy, several
studies have indicated that cadets are receiving from just
under five hours to 5.5 hours of sleep per night during the
academic week, similar to West Point (Dyche, Hoggan, &
Lindsay, 2006; Lindsay & Dyche, 2005; Lindsay, Lee, &
Dyche, 2006).
In light of these results, one might argue that sleep is
restricted because these are training environments and,
therefore, not ‘‘typical’’ of a traditional military environ-
ment. However, it could also be argued that they are more
like an actual deployed environment, where demands
typically exceed resources and there are unrestrained
expectations regarding an individual’s time. One of the
traditional sayings in the military is to ‘‘train like you are
going to fight’’. If this is the case, then these training
environments are more typical of the actual type of
environment that military members will face when
accomplishing their wartime mission. As one of the authors
can attest after having been recently deployed to
Afghanistan, this is certainly the case. Therefore, these
data indicate that military members are often in a sleep-
deprived state during training or when accomplishing the
mission. When added to the fact that sleep loss is often
associated with decreased cognitive functioning and
decision making, what are the resultant effects on training
programs? Does that mean that individuals are not able to
get as much out of the training as they could have if they
were well rested? More research needs to be done in this
area to see how sleep deprived trainees learn complex
material (such as network-centric warfare technology), and
the subsequent effects on actual performance in extreme
environments.
Sleep Loss, Cognitive Functioning and Decision Making
As previously stated, sleep loss affects individuals in a
host of different ways and results in significant negative
outcomes. For example, sleep deprivation has been tied to
numerous disasters such as Chernobyl, Three Mile Island,
and the Space Shuttle Challenger (Mitler et al., 1988). In
1988 alone, the economic cost of accidents related to sleep
was estimated somewhere between $43 and $56 billion
(Leger, 1994). These results show that sleep is important
and has very real consequences besides just being tired
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during the day. At the individual level, research has shown
that sleep loss affects cognitive functioning, decision
making, performance, memory/learning, and general day-
time sleepiness (Belenky et al., 2003; Caldwell & LeDuc,
1998; Harrison & Horne, 1999; 2000; Heuer & Klein,
2003; Philip et al., 2005; Pilcher & Huffcut, 1996; Wyatt &
Bootzin, 1994). As an example, one study showed that just
one night of sleep deprivation tended to decrease cognitive
performance by 30 to 40 percent, whereas two nights of
sleep deprivation resulted in 60 to 70 percent decline in
performance (Buguet, Moroz, & Radomski, 2003). Due to
the very nature of global, world-wide military operations,
when these effects of sleep loss are translated into a military
context, the results are literally a matter of life or death.
One manner in which sleep loss has been characterized is
through the term sleep debt. This term ‘‘refers to the
increased pressure for sleep that results from an inadequate
amount of physiologically normal sleep’’ (Van Dongen,
Rogers, & Dinges, 2003). When an insufficient amount of
sleep is received over a prolonged period of time, it is often
referred to as chronic (Dement & Vaughn, 1999). While
this idea is widely known, little is known about its effects
on cognitive and behavioral processes. Recent research
concluded there was evidence that this type of chronic sleep
loss does indeed affect individual functioning (Pilcher &
Huffcutt, 1996).
In an effort to try and determine the effects of chronic
sleep loss on accumulating sleep debt, researchers con-
ducted a study to see how performance changed over a two
week period of time for those who received four, six, and
eight hours of sleep per night and another group who
received no sleep for three days (Van Dongen et al., 2003).
They found that neurobehavioral function decreased as the
amount of sleep lost per night increased so that those with
only four hours of sleep per night over the study performed
worse on tasks than those with six or eight hours per night.
Moreover, Van Dongen discovered that performance of the
moderate sleep loss group (six-hour group) after two weeks
was not different from the total sleep deprivation group
after two full days. This demonstrates that even moderate
sleep loss over time amounts to severe neurobehavioral
deficits akin to 48 hours sleep loss.
In a related study, Drake and colleagues not only
examine this idea of sleep debt, but studied how sleep debt
is accumulated (Drake et al., 2001). They compared one
night of total sleep deprivation (eight hours of sleep loss)
versus losing two hours per night over four nights and four
hours per night for two nights (for a total of eight hours of
sleep debt in each of the three groups). Results indicated
that the total sleep deprivation condition performed worst,
followed by the four-hour condition and the six-hour
condition. In total, all sleep loss conditions indicated poorer
performance on memory and vigilance tasks, as compared
to baseline measures. This is critical, since sleep debt, even
when accumulated slowly over time (two hours per night)
still impacts performance. Therefore, it is not only the loss
of sleep that can affect performance, but also the effects of
that sleep loss over time (i.e., sleep debt). Of particular
interest for military members is that, while there may be
periods of total sleep deprivation in deployed or wartime
environments, it is more likely that chronically restricted
sleep will occur more commonly, due to adverse conditions
and environmental constraints. As the previous results
indicate, this restricted sleep will have performance
consequences.
Other research has been conducted that focuses specifi-
cally on cognitive performance with military personnel.
Banderet and colleagues studied soldier’s performance on
team tasks during periods of total sleep loss (up to 80
hours) (Banderet, Stokes, Francesconi, Kowal, & Naitoh,
1981). Their results indicated that, starting around 36
hours, soldiers lost track of critical tasks, failed to update
maps with changing information, put off important tasks,
and experienced the lack of ability to cope with unforeseen
and rapid changes (Harrison & Horne, 1999; 2000). In fact,
the soldiers gave up on the task after 45 hours without
sleep.
Another example involves British soldiers during an
intense 10-week training program (May & Kline, 1987).
Soldiers were evaluated after a two-day exercise in which
they received no sleep. Significant decrements in perfor-
mance were evident in the areas of visual encoding,
scanning, and production of novel responses. In a military
setting, these areas translate directly to tasks such as map
reading, detecting camouflaged objects, encoding and
decoding messages, using map coordinates, and flexible
thinking. In addition, Kobbeltvedt and colleagues found in
their study on military personnel that sleep deprivation led
to longer task completion time versus those not sleep
deprived (Kobbeltvedt, Brun, & Laberg, 2005). More
comprehensive studies have also been undertaken to study
sleep in a ‘‘realistic’’ military setting (Lieberman et al.,
2005). Researchers examined elite Army soldiers involved
in a live-fire training exercise who were exposed to
multiple stressors (sleep loss, temperature, and limited
food). Results indicated that, even in a highly-trained and
experienced unit, substantial degradation in cognitive
function, vigilance, reaction time, memory, and reasoning
were experienced due to stressors such as sleep loss.
In the context of network-centric warfare, these results
have obvious significant implications. In many cases the
limiting factor in information dissemination is the human
operator. Even under the best circumstances, it is possible
to overwhelm individual soldiers with more information
than they can handle. However, based on the above results,
it is obvious that the amount of information may not be the
critical choke-point. Instead, it may be the condition of the
soldier who is responsible for handling that information.
While it is readily apparent that losing one night of sleep
will impact performance the following day, it is becoming
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clear that even partial sleep deprivation also affects
performance. This partial loss of sleep is cumulative, and
will continue to influence soldier performance until it is
eliminated.
Impact
The environment in which we currently have US military
forces varies depending upon their particular tasking.
Certainly forces in support of ongoing military operations
(i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq) will be significantly different
than those supporting military operations other than war
(MOOTW). As a result, the specific operational constraints
on any given military member will differ depending on
their particular role. However, the military reliance on
information operations and networked systems is the
process through which we conduct operations, and is
consistent across the particular taskings in which military
personnel are involved. Therefore, several general recom-
mendations can be offered that transcend specific opera-
tional missions.
The first of these has to do with leadership. Commanders
set the tone and to a large degree the operational tempo of
their organization. While readiness of weapon systems and
technology is crucial to proper functioning of a military
organization, equally important, if not more so, is the
readiness of personnel. The military has a tough guy/gal
image, in which self-denial and pushing to the extremes are
a normal part of day-to-day operations. In fact, many of the
training practices and programs in the military are set up to
‘‘push’’ the individual soldier to their limits (e.g. Basic
Training). While this has positive future implications for
the soldier in terms of knowing what they can handle and
where their individual limits are, it must also be tempered
with a measure of responsibility from the soldier’s chain of
command. This responsibility entails understanding the role
of the operational tempo on the unit. Since operational
planning often dictates the tempo of an operation,
commanders have some discretion as to the fielding of
their forces. Obviously, when possible, this tempo needs to
be managed to maximize soldier performance. For
example, if day-to-day tasking is at such an accelerated
pace that individuals are struggling to keep up (increasing
sleep debt by falling behind on their sleep), then when it
comes time to surge operations to meet a new threat or a
change to an existing threat, there is no reserve left to give.
Soldiers, due to their professionalism and dedication, will
confront the challenge, but the soldier will not face the
challenge at their best, and may be far from it. In the past,
the physical requirements of the individual solider were
paramount. However, today’s military also requires
cognitive fitness, and part of that fitness lies in getting an
adequate amount of sleep. The leader plays the critical role
in this effort. Research conducted at the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research in the area of leadership provides
evidence that leadership is important in predicting the
psychological consequences of stressors such as lack of
sleep (Britt, Davidson, Bliese, & Castro, 2004).
Jonathan Shay stated that this notion of protecting our
soldiers needs to start with the officer corps and that ‘‘It is
time to critically re-examine our love affair with stoic self-
denial, starting with the Service Academies’’ (Shay, 1998).
However, as mentioned earlier, cadets at our Service
Academies are getting less sleep than they need. Of
particular importance to the current discussion is that there
is evidence that this habit of getting less sleep at the Service
Academies extends to active duty, and even to those in
non-operational jobs (Pinchak, Kajdasz, & Dyche, 2006).
The second impact is more theoretical and, therefore, is
offered in a series of questions. It has to do with degraded
environments and their impact on all phases of our forces.
This specifically applies to the types of technologies that
are developed for use in the armed forces. If it is known
that soldiers are often working at less than optimal capacity
(due to truncated sleep and other operational conditions),
how might this affect how we design technology to fit into
the network-centric architecture of the future? In other
words, what happens when technology is developed to be
used in ideal conditions, only to find that, when it is
actually used, those perfect conditions can’t be found? Is it
possible to develop technology that is more resistant to
these types of cognitive limitations? For example, there is
some research to support the idea that certain types of
cognitive processing are fairly resistent to sleep depriva-
tion, while others are not (Harrison & Horne, 2000). If this
is the case, then maybe these known limitations need to be
incorporated into the design process of network-centric
technology. If one is unable to change the operational
environment (as is usually the case), then why not approach
it from the technology standpoint?
Next, what about the capacity of the military recruit?
How might advancements in technology affect how we are
recruiting our future military forces? For example, the
architecture by which we recruit and assess future military
members prior to their accession into the military has
changed little over the past several decades, while the
requirements of the individual have changed drastically.
This leads to a potential discrepancy that must be made up
in either training or on the job. Is this the most efficient way
to do this? Finally, what are the results of sustained chronic
sleep restriction? As previously mentioned, studies have
examined restricted sleep over relatively short periods of
time (between several days and several weeks). However,
what happens when this chronic sleep restriction is
maintained for substantially longer periods of time such
as a six- or 12-month deployment? More research needs to
be done in order to answer these questions.
The final impact deals with quality of life for the
individual soldier. The military is among the most arduous
professions, due to its oath to support and defend the
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Constitution, and its constant mobility requirements (not
just deployments, but changing jobs and stations every
couple of years: see Sanchez, Bray, Vincus, & Bann,
2004). However, that does not mean that due care cannot be
taken with the management of our forces. For example, the
basic treatment of our military members affects organiza-
tional factors such as job satisfaction. This is important,
since military members with higher job satisfaction are
more likely to stay in the military, or report that they intend
to stay (Becker & Billings, 1993; Kocher & Thomas, 1994;
Prevosto, 2001). As another example, a relationship was
found between lifestyle regularity and sleep quality, such
that people with higher levels of lifestyle regularity
reported fewer sleep problems (Monk, Reynolds, Buysse,
DeGrazia, & Kupfer, 2003). Again, in a military context,
this is not always possible. However, when in garrison, it
quite often is possible. This fits back in with the first
implication, that of leadership, since many of these issues
are a result of the type of organizational climate developed
by the individual commander.
Current Status
This issue of sleep loss and sleep restriction would be
incomplete without a discussion of what this all means in
an operational context. The previous section focused on the
implications of limited sleep for the military and its
personnel. With that in mind, it is important to examine
what is currently being done in the military with respect to
sleep loss/restriction. Two primary methods have been used
to counter these sleep-loss effects. One of the primary
means has been through pharmacological agents. In the
past, amphetamines have been used to sustain wakefulness.
However, they often have side effects, such as sleep and
psychiatric disturbances, addiction, and cardiovascular
problems (Westcott, 2005). Another alternative, caffeine,
has also been examined, due to its lower potential for
dependence, but with the side effects of tremors, irritability,
and diuresis. Current research is more supportive of the
benefits of caffeine. For example, it was found that
moderate doses of caffeine improved cognitive function,
including vigilance, memory, learning, and mood state
among US Navy SEAL trainees under limited sleep
conditions (Lieberman, Tharion, Shukitt-Hale, Speckman,
& Tulley, 2002).
While pharmacological agents do have the ability to
prolong wakefulness, the side effects could almost be
argued as worse than the sleep loss itself. Therefore,
research has focused on another agent, modafinil, as a way
around many of these side effects. It does not have the
addictive properties of amphetamines, and has the ability to
increase wakefulness and improve cognitive performance
during sustained military operations (Westcott, 2005).
Preliminary research supports the benefits of modafinil on
the attenuation of sleep deprivation with respect to
cognitive processing (e.g., Caldwell, Caldwell, Smythe, &
Hall, 2000; Wesensten et al., 2002).
The other method by which researchers have examined
mitigating the effects of sleep deprivation is through the
elimination of sleep debt. One way to do this is through
naps. Research has shown that naps ranging from 10 to 20
minutes can ameliorate the effects of sleep restriction
(Gillberg, Kecklund, Axelsson, & Akerstedt, 1996; Horne
& Reyner, 1996). In fact, the converging evidence indicates
that brief naps are recuperative and can be as effective as
longer naps in dealing with sleep restriction (Tietzel &
Lack, 2001). Another method is through recovery sleep.
This involves receiving adequate amounts of sleep (8 hours
or more) following periods of sleep restriction. A study at
the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research tested this idea
of recuperative sleep following sleep restriction (Belenky
et al., 2003). Researchers examined individuals who had
received three, five, seven, and nine hours in bed per night
over a seven day period on several tasks. Then, individuals
were allowed three nights of ‘‘normal’’ sleep (eight hours in
bed). Initial improvements were evident after recovery for
those who received three hours sleep per night. However,
performance for all sleep-restricted groups (three, five, and
seven hours) were still below baseline performance, even
after the three nights of recovery sleep. This indicates that
the brain is engaging in a limiting process that prohibits
rapid recovery of performance back to the level prior to
sleep restriction. In the case of the cadets at the Service
Academies that were previously mentioned, their attempts
to get more sleep in the weekends may have little actual
impact on improved performance the following week.
These results have several direct links to military
performance. While it has been shown that naps will help
in cognitive performance following sleep restriction, this is
a temporary measure at best. It may prolong work by the
individual in the short term, but performance will
eventually suffer as the sleep loss/restriction continues.
The same is the case for recovery sleep. While it will help
in the long run (by eliminating the accumulated sleep debt),
short term benefits of recovery sleep are not borne out by
the literature: it takes time to recover from sleep debt. This
means that, as soldiers are continuing in this degraded sleep
environment, their performance is predictably going to
continue to suffer.
Conclusion
Sleep is important, and critically so in a network-centric
environment. ‘‘Even in well-equipped, well-trained, highly
motivated soldiers operating within cohesive units with
good morale, sleep remains a critical factor for maintaining
the operational capabilities enabled (and required) by a
network-centric environment’’ (Wesensten et al., 2005, p.
100). As previous research indicates, sleep loss and
restriction have many significant adverse effects for
D. R. Lindsay and J. Dyche / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments
military personnel. In a network-centric environment, these
effects are even more critical. First, overall performance
will be degraded the longer the soldier is in this sleep-
deprived or sleep-restricted state. Their readiness will be
lower than what is needed in such an environment. Second,
due to the sleep loss and other environmental factors, the
soldier may not be able to process the myriad pieces of
information that are available. Even if they are able to get
the information, they may not be able to interpret it in the
right way. Finally, the output of the individual soldier that
is fed back into the networked system, and relied upon by
others, will be impacted by this lowered performance,
thereby affecting the entire networked system.
It has been the attempt of this paper to illuminate why
something as simple as sleep can obstruct even the most
technologically-advanced military forces the world has ever
seen. If assumptions are made as to the ability and
readiness of our soldiers, and then due to environmental
situations and pressures they are not able to live up to that
level of performance, who will ultimately pay the price? It
is suggested here that the very networked environment that
is used to wage war will be the same one that will pay
the price of suboptimal performance. Put another way, the
cognitive platform (the individual soldier) and not the
technological platform could end up being the limiting
factor. Not because of lack of ability, but because of
something as simple as the lack of sufficient sleep.
References
Air Force Personnel Service News Service (2006). Service demographics
offer snapshot of force. Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/news/story.
asp?storyID5123019185
Banderet, L., Stokes, J., Francesconi, R., Kowal, D., & Naitoh, P. (1981).
Artillery teams in simulated sustained combat: Performance and other
measures. In L.C. Johnson, D.J. Tepas, W.P. Colquhoun, & M.H.
Colligan (Eds), Biological rhythms, sleep, and shiftwork, New York:
Spectrum.
Becker, T. E. & Billings, R. S. (1993). Profiles of commitment: An
empirical test. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 14, 177–190, doi:
10.1002/job.4030140207.
Belenky, G., Wesensten, N. J., Thorne, D. R., Thomas, M. L., Sing, H. C.,
Redmond, D. P., ..., & Balkin, T. J. (2003). Patterns of performance
degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent
recovery: A sleep dose-response study. Journal of Sleep Research, 12,
1–12, doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2869.2003.00337.x.
Bonnet, M. H. & Arand, D. L. (1995). We are chronically sleep deprived.
Sleep, 18, 908–911.
Britt, T. W., Davison, J., Bliese, P. D., & Castro, C. A. (2004). How
leaders can influence the impact that stressors have on soldiers.
Military Medicine, 169, 541–545.
Buguet, A., Moroz, D., & Radomski, M. (2003). Modafinil-medical
considerations for use in sustained operations. Aviation, Space, and
Environmental Medicine, 74, 659–663.
Caldwell, J. A. & LeDuc, P. A. (1998). Gender influences on performance,
mood and recovery sleep in fatigued aviators. Ergonomics, 41, 1757–
1770, doi: 10.1080/001401398185956.
Caldwell, J. A., Caldwell, J. L., Smythe, N. K., & Hall, K. K. (2000). A
double-blind, placebo-controlled investigation of the efficacy of
Modafinil for sustaining the alertness and performance of aviators: A
helicopter simulator study. Psychopharmacology, 150, 272–282, doi:
10.1007/s002130000450.
Cammons, D., Tisserand, J. Williams, D., Seise, A., & Lindsay, D. (2006).
Network centric case study: US v corps and 3rd infantry division
(mechanized) during operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations.
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Carskadon, M. A. (1990). Patterns of sleep and sleepiness in adolescents.
Pediatrician, 17, 5–12.
Carskadon, M. A. & Dement, W. C. (1981). Cumulative effects of sleep
restriction on daytime sleepiness. Psychophysiology, 18, 107–113, doi:
10.1111/j.1469-8986.1981.tb02921.x.
Carskadon, M., Vieira, C., & Acebo, C. (1993). Association between
puberty and delayed phase preference. Sleep, 16, 258–262.
Carskadon, M. A., Wolfson, A. R., Tzischinsky, O., & Acebo, C. (1995).
Early school schedules modify adolescent sleepiness. Sleep Research,
24, 92.
Dement, W. C. & Vaughn, C. (1999). The promise of sleep: A pioneer in
sleep medicine explores the vital connection between health, happi-
ness, and a good night’s sleep. New York: Dell Publishing.
Dinges, D. F., Maislin, G., Kuo, A., Carlin, M. M., Powell, J. W., Van
Dongen, H., & Mullington, J. (1999), Chronic sleep restriction:
Neurobehavioral effects of 4, 6, and 8 h TIB. Sleep, 22, 115.
Dinges, D. F., Pack, F., Williams, K., Gillen, K. A., Powell, J. W., Ott,
G. E., Aptowicz, C., & Pack, A. I. (1997). Cumulative sleepiness,
mood disturbance, and psychomotor vigilance performance decrements
during a week of sleep restricted to 4–5 hours per night. Sleep, 20,
267–277.
Drake, C. L., Roehrs, T. A., Burduvali, E., Bonahoom, A., Rosekind, M.,
& Roth, T. (2001). Effects of rapid versus slow accumulation of eight
hours of sleep loss. Psychophysiology, 38, 979–987, doi: 10.1111/
1469-8986.3860979.
Dyche, J., Hoggan, J., & Lindsay, D. R. (2006). Sleep behavior of us air
force academy cadets around and during spring break. Poster session
presented at the 20th Annual Associated Professional Sleep Societies
Meeting, Salt Lake City, UT.
Foster, D. & Lindsay, D. (2011). Generational differences and the future
of the United States military. In J. Belanger and L. Psalm (Eds),
Developing the next generation military leaders: Challenges, impera-
tives, and strategies (pp. 1–21). Canadian Defence Academy Press,
Kingston, Ontario.
Gillberg, M., Kecklund, G., Axelsson, J., & Akerstedt, T. (1996). The
effects of a short daytime nap after restricted night sleep. Sleep, 19,
570–575.
Harrison, Y. & Horne, J. A. (2000). The impact of sleep deprivation on
decision making: A review. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 6, 236–2409, doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.6.3.236.
Harrison, Y. & Horne, J. A. (1999). One night of sleep loss impairs
innovative thinking and flexible decision making. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 78, 128–145, doi: 10.1006/
obhd.1999.2827.
Heuer, H. & Klein, W. (2003). One night of total sleep deprivation impairs
implicit learning in the serial reduction task, but not the behavioral
expression of knowledge. Neuropsychology, 17, 507–516, doi: 10.
1037/0894-4105.17.3.507.
Horne, J. A. & Pettitt, A. N. (1985). High incentive effects on vigilance
performance during 72 hours of total sleep deprivation. Acta
Psychologica, 58, 123–139, doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(85)90003-4.
Horne, J. A. & Reyner, L. A. (1996). Counteracting driver sleepiness:
Effects of napping, caffeine, placebo. Psychophysiology, 33, 306–309,
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.1996.tb00428.x.
Jean-Louis, G., Kripke, D. F., & Ancoli-Israel, S. (2000). Sleep and quality
of well-being. Sleep, 23, 1115–1121.
Kenny, A. & Neverosky, D. T. (2004). Quantifying sleep and performance
of west point cadets: A baseline study. Unpublished Master’s thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
D. R. Lindsay and J. Dyche / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments
Kobbeltvedt, T., Brun, W., & Laberg, J. C. (2005). Cognitive processes in
planning and judgments under sleep deprivation and time pressure.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 98, 1–14,
doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.05.002.
Kocher, K. M. & Thomas, G. W. (1994). Retaining Army nurses: A
longitudinal model. Research in Nursing and Health, 17, 59–65, doi:
10.1002/nur.4770170109.
Kripke, D. F., Garfinkel, L., Wingard, D. L., Klauber, M. R., & Marler,
M. R. (2002). Mortality associated with sleep duration and insomnia.
Archives of General Psychiatry, 59, 131–136, doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.
59.2.131.
Leger, D. (1994). The cost of sleep-related accidents: A report for the
national commission on sleep disorders research. Sleep, 17, 84–93.
Lieberman, H. R., Bathalon, G. P., Falco, C. M., Kramer, F. M., Morgan,
C. A., & Niro, P. (2005). Severe decrements in cognitive function and
mood induced by sleep loss, heat, dehydration, and undernutrition
during simulated combat. Biological Psychiatry, 57, 422–429, doi: 10.
1016/j.biopsych.2004.11.014.
Lieberman, H. R., Tharion, W. J., Shukitt-Hale, B., Speckman, K. L., &
Tulley, R. (2002). Effects of caffeine, sleep loss, and stress on
cognitive performance and mood during U.S. Navy SEAL training.
Psychopharmacology, 164, 250–261, doi: 10.1007/s00213-002-
1217-9.
Lindsay, D. R. & Dyche, J. (2005). Sleep changes as cadets matriculate
through educational and leadership training. (Unpublished raw data).
Lindsay, D. R., Dyche, J., & Eatman, R. (2005). Sleep habits at the united
states air force academy. Poster session presented at the 19th Annual
Associated Professional Sleep Societies Meeting, Denver, CO.
Lindsay, D. R., Lee, D., & Dyche, J. (2006, June). Actigraphic assessment
of sleep in us air force academy cadets. Poster session presented at the
20th Annual Associated Professional Sleep Societies Meeting, Salt Lake
City, UT.
Mastroianni, G. R. (2005). Occupations, cultures, and leadership in the
army and the air force. Parameters, 76–90.
May, J. & Kline, P. (1987). Measuring the effects upon cognitive abilities
of sleep loss during continuous operations. British Journal of
Psychology, 78, 443–455, doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1987.tb02261.x.
Meyerhoff, J. L., Hebert, M. A., Huhman, K. L., Mougey, E. H.,
Oleshansky, M. A., & Potegal, M. (2000). Operational stress and
combat stress reaction: Neurobiological approaches toward improving
assessment of risk and enhancing intervention. In K. Friedl, H.R.
Lieberman, D.H. Ryan, & G.A. Bray (Eds). Countermeasures for
Battlefield Stressors (pp. 27–87). Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press.
Miller, N. L. & Shattuck, L. G. (2005). Sleep patterns of young men and
women enrolled at the United States Military Academy: Results from
year one of a four year longitudinal study. Sleep, 28, 837–841.
Miller, N. L., Dyche, J., Andrews, C., & Lucas, T. (2004). Navy boot
camp: Test score changes after two hour increase in sleep time. Sleep
Abstracts, 27, 436.
Miller, N. L., Bierly, T., Hansen, E., Haylett, D., Marion, J., Marty, K., ...,
& Wong, M. (2000). Cadet sleep, fatigue and performance: Initial
assessments. Unpublished Report. United States Air Force Academy.
Mitler, M. M., Carskadon, M. A., Czeisler, C. A., Dement, W. C., Dinges,
D. F., & Graeber, R. C. (1988). Catastrophes, sleep and public policy:
Consensus report. Sleep, 11, 100–109.
Monk, T. H., Reynolds, C. F., Buysse, D. J., DeGrazia, J. M., & Kupfer,
D. J. (2003). The relationship between lifestyle regularity and
subjective sleep quality. Chronobiology International, 20, 97–107,
doi: 10.1081/CBI-120017812.
National Sleep Foundation. (2002). Sleep in America poll. Retrieved from
http://www.sleepfoundation.org/article/sleep-america-polls/2002-adult-
sleep-habits
Office of Force Transformation. (2005). The implementation of network-
centric warfare. Washington, DC: Office of Force Transformation.
Philip, P., Sagaspe, P., Moore, N., Taillard, J., Charles, A., Builleminault,
C., & Bioulac, B. (2005). Fatigue, sleep restriction and driving
performance. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 37, 473–478, doi: 10.
1016/j.aap.2004.07.007.
Pilcher, J. J. & Huffcutt, A. I. (1996). Effects of sleep deprivation on
performance: A meta-analysis. Sleep, 19, 318–326.
Pinchak, A., Kajdasz, J., & Dyche, J. (2006). Cognitive performance and
sleep in USAFA cadets and 2nd lieutenants. Paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the Rocky Mountain Psychological Association,
Park City, UT, April, 2006.
Prevosto, P. (2001). The effect of ‘‘mentored’’ relationships on satisfaction
and intent to stay of company-grade US Army reserve nurses. Military
Medicine, 166, 21–26.
Sanchez, R. P., Bray, R. M., Vincus, A. A., & Bann, C. M. (2004).
Predictors of job satisfaction among active duty and reserve/guard
personnel in the US military. Military Psychology, 16, 19–35, doi: 10.
1207/s15327876mp1601_2.
Shay, J. (1998). Ethical standing for commander self-care: The need for
sleep. Parameters, 93–105.
Tietzel, A. J. & Lack, L. C. (2001). The short-term benefits of brief and
long naps following nocturnal sleep restriction. Sleep, 24, 293–300.
Van Dongen, H. P., Maislin, G., Mullington, J. M., & Dinges, D. F.
(2003). The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: Dose-response
effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from
chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. Sleep, 26, 117–
126.
Van Dongen, H. P., Rogers, N., & Dinges, D. (2003). Sleep debt:
Theoretical and empirical issues. Sleep and Biological Rhythms, 1, 5–
13, doi: 10.1046/j.1446-9235.2003.00006.x.
Wesensten, N. J., Belenky, G., & Balkin, T. J. (2005) Cognitive readiness
in network-centric operations. Parameters, 94–105.
Wesensten, N. J., Belenky, G., Kautz, M. A., Thorne, D. R., Reichardt, R. M.,
& Balkin, T. J. (2002). Maintaining alertness and performance during
sleep deprivation: Modafinil versus caffeine. Psychopharmacology, 159,
238–247, doi: 10.1007/s002130100916.
Westcott, K. J. (2005). Modafinil, sleep deprivation, and cognitive
function in military and medical settings. Military Medicine, 170, 333–
335.
Wolfson, A. R. & Carskadon, M. A. (1998). Sleep schedules and daytime
functioning in adolescents. Child Development, 69, 875–887.
Wolfson, A. R. & Carskadon, M. A. (2003). Understanding adolescents’
sleep patterns and school performance: A critical approach. Sleep
Medicine Review, 7, 491–506, doi: 10.1016/S1087-0792(03)90003-7.
Wyatt, J. K. & Bootzin, R. R. (1994). Cognitive processing and sleep:
Implications for enhancing job performance. Human Performance, 7,
119–139, doi: 10.1207/s15327043hup0702_2.
D. R. Lindsay and J. Dyche / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments
